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The Turkish Presidential Elections of
10 August 2014
IOANNIS N. GRIGORIADIS
Department of Political Science & Public Administration, Bilkent University, Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey
ABSTRACT The Turkish presidential elections of 10 August 2014 were the first direct
elections in the history of republican Turkey. The election of prime minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan in the first round illustrated his dominant position in Turkish politics, as well as the
inability of opposition parties to provide an alternative candidate who appealed to the Turkish
electorate. Growing social polarization and concern about emerging autocratic tendencies,
corruption allegations and the multilevel crisis in the Middle East failed to dissuade Turkish
voters. Nevertheless, the fulfilment of Erdoğan’s declared intention of introducing
presidentialism in Turkey will depend on the result of the upcoming parliamentary elections,
to be held in June 2015 at the latest.
Introduction
Presidential elections were held in Turkey on 10 August 2014 and led to the election
of prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This was the first time in the history of the
Republic of Turkey that the people were called to directly elect the head of state in an
open and competitive election. Until the 2007 constitutional amendment, the
president was elected by the Turkish Grand National Assembly with qualified
majority and for a seven-year tenure. The former president Abdullah Gül was the last
to be elected in this way. According to the new system, the president is elected for a
period of five years by popular vote; but there was no major overhaul of his powers.
A Landslide Victory for Prime Minister Erdoğan
Three candidates were presented in this historic election. Following months of
speculation about his intentions, the country’s prime minister, founding president of
the incumbent Justice andDevelopment Party (Adalet veKalkınmaPartisi – AKP) and
towering figure of Turkish politics in the last decade, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, became
the AKP’s candidate. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, a university professor and former
q 2015 Taylor & Francis
*Correspondence Address: Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Department of Political Science & Public
Administration, Bilkent University, Room T-364, Bilkent, Ankara TR-06800, Turkey. Email:
ioannis@bilkent.edu.tr
Mediterranean Politics, 2015
Vol. 20, No. 1, 105–110, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2014.997430
SecretaryGeneral of theOrganization of the Islamic Conference (OIC),was the second
candidate, endorsed by the two biggest opposition parties, the Republican People’s
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci
Hareket Partisi – MHP). Selahattin Demirtaş, a member of the Turkish parliament,
former mayor of Diyarbakır and leading political figure of Turkey’s Kurdish
minority, was the third. He was supported by the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic
Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi – HDP). The election campaign took place in a
polarized political environment for a number of reasons.
First, the secularist segment of Turkish society was getting increasingly unsettled
by the growing authoritarian tendencies of the Erdoğan administration, in particular
following the June 2013 Gezi events and government limitations on access to the
internet. The political situation became more tense in December 2013, when a major
corruption investigation broke out, involving four government ministers and reaching
up to the prime minister and his family. This led to an all-out war between prime
minister Erdoğan and prominent Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen and his religious
movement, as well as blatant government interventions against the independence of
the judiciary. Last but not least, the situation in Iraq and Syria had a bearing on
political developments: 49 Turkish citizens were held hostage throughout the
presidential election campaign in Turkey’s General Consulate in Mosul by ‘Islamic
State’ militants. These were eventually released after the election in an apparent swap
deal of ‘Islamic State’ detainees. Turkish policies towards Syria and Iraq – in
particular in relation to ‘Islamic State’, Iraqi and SyrianKurdish groups – had a strong
bearing on Turkey’s own Kurdish question. Despite all these factors, the AKP had
performed rather well in the March 2014 local elections, in which it was able again to
secure a comfortable majority, as well as maintain its control of the country’s two
biggest metropolitan municipalities, Istanbul and Ankara. This proved a rather
auspicious signal for the electoral fortunes of the AKP and prime minister Erdoğan.
The electoral campaign focused on the topics chosen by prime minister Erdoğan.
His personal charisma, aswell as government influence on themassmedia contributed
to the framing of the campaign according to his preferences. In November 2014,
TRT Türk, one of the channels of Turkish national broadcaster TRT, was sentenced
by the Higher Radio Television Council for violating the principle of impartiality:
Between 6 and 8 August 2014, 5 hours 26 minutes of television time were allocated
to Erdoğan and no time to the other two presidential candidates.
In his speeches, Erdoğan highlighted the achievements of his 11-year rule as prime
minister, as well as his vision of a ‘strong’ and ‘new’ Turkey. According to him, this
Turkey would rise to the challenges of globalization and gain a key position in global
politics and economics by 2023, the centennial year of the Republic. Against this
backdrop, Erdoğan warned that Turkey’s enemies fought against him within and
outside the country and pointed to the December 2012 corruption investigation as a
‘sinister plot’ of the ‘parallel state.’ Under this term, the Turkish prime minister and
presidential candidate referred to the Gülen religious movement, a former key ally
which had suddenly turned into an arch-enemy. Defending Turkey and its
accomplishments against its external enemies and their domestic accomplices
emerged as a key discourse item of the Erdoğan campaign.
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One of the most important issues that Erdoğan raised during his campaign was the
introduction of a presidential system through a profound constitutional amendment.
The discussion about a far-reaching constitutional reform was not a new one. It dates
back to 2007, when prime minister Erdoğan, amidst his confrontation with Turkey’s
military, promised a new civilian, democratic constitution as a remedy for further
military interventions into politics and for the limited and non-comprehensive
constitutional protection of human rights. While a constitutional reform was
approved by referendum in 2010, it appeared to be far less ambitious than expected
and desired. As the AKP and prime minister Erdoğan were able to effectively end
the military tutelage over Turkish politics, the debate on constitutional reform
abated and eventually shifted. The need for a new constitution was not denied by
Erdoğan and his party. Nevertheless, instead of democratic consolidation and better
protection of human rights and liberties, the key element of constitutional reform for
the AKP was meant to be the introduction of a presidential system that would befit
the preferences and ambitions of the AKP administration. The latter and Erdoğan
himself had repeatedly voiced their view that the parliamentary system does not suit
Turkish political culture and needs, as well as their determination to introduce a
presidential system. While many thought that the French or the US model served as
sources of inspiration, it appeared from the study of party publications and public
statements on this matter that Latin American presidential models would probably
be closer to the model desired by the AKP.
Opinion polls throughout the presidential election campaign predicted that prime
minister Erdoğan could win more than 50 per cent of the vote and make a second round
unnecessary. In the end, Erdoğan won 51.79 per cent and 21,000,143 votes. Ekmeleddin
Ihsanoğlu, the joint candidate of the CHP and MHP, got 38.44 per cent of the vote and
15,587,720 votes. Selahattin Demirtaş, the third candidate, supported by the HDP,
obtained 9.76 per cent and 3,958,048 votes. The voter turnout was 74.13 per cent. Even
though the 51.8 per cent which prime minister Erdoğan won was lower than the
predictions of opinion polls, which had given an estimate of 55–60 per cent, thiswas still
a major personal success for the Turkish prime minister. This victory was achieved
against the backdrop of growing social polarization, major corruption allegations that
shook the government and temporarily gave the impression that the future of the AKP
administration lay at stake, as well as the escalation of conflicts in theMiddle East. The
majority of Turkish voters seemed adamant in support for Erdoğan and indifferent to
the deterioration of the government’s human rights record, serious corruption
allegations, as well as the various foreign policy crises. It rather paid attention to
concerns that the potential departure of Erdoğan and his party could destabilize
the economy and put hard-won economic improvements into question.
Another Electoral Disappointment for the Opposition
The major opposition parties once again failed to make any substantial gains in the
10 August presidential elections. Both the CHP and the MHP decided to support a
common presidential candidate, who would not necessarily represent the
preferences of the core electoral clientele of the two parties but would be in a
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position to challenge the dominant position of the AKP. Given the growing
alienation of the CHP from the AKP’s religious conservative electoral base, pundits
remarked that the CHP should make an opening to religious conservative voters
through its choice of a presidential candidate with supposedly impeccable Islamic
credentials. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu appeared an ideal candidate in that respect, as he
originated from a prominent Ottoman family and is one of the most renowned
Islamic scholars engaged in inter-civilizational dialogue. He also used to be the
Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and enjoyed the
support of the Erdoğan administration before falling out of favour over his stance on
the July 2013 military coup in Egypt. The CHP’s agreement with the third biggest
political party, the MHP, on jointly nominating Ihsanoğlu was hoped to deliver a
message of national unity and boost Ihsanoğlu’s election chances against what
appeared as a polarizing political campaign on the side of the AKP. Nonetheless, the
voters proved insensitive to these qualities. Despite the early surprise and interest
that his candidacy generated and his strong Islamist credentials, Ihsanoğlu failed to
make inroads into the conservative Muslim electoral clientele that forms the
powerbase of the AKP. His campaign was influenced by the political agenda of the
coalition parties and did not include any personal elements; hence, it proved rather
anaemic and uninspiring. Focusing on issues of social justice and political integrity
failed to frame the presidential competition. As a result he could not shed the image
of an uncharismatic member of Turkey’s upper class who appeared distant and
irrelevant to the Turkish citizen. To make things worse, his Islamist credentials
backfired within the ranks of opposition party supporters. For many CHP voters and
– in particular – those considered as ‘ulusalcı’ or neo-nationalist, Ihsanoğlu was too
Islamist for their tastes. In addition, they failed to subscribe to the logic of opening
up to the conservative segment of Turkish society. While their opposition to the two
other presidential candidates, Erdoğan and Demirtaş, may have been stronger for
other reasons, the fact that the election date was set in the middle of the summer
vacation season had an important consequence. Many members of the secularist
middle and upper-middle classes chose not to interrupt their holidays and return to
the big city centres to vote. Abstaining from the ballot box thus gave the Erdoğan
candidacy crucial leverage.
Equally important was the apparent ‘defection’ of a sizeable segment of
traditional MHP voters from the candidacy of Ihsanoğlu to that of Erdoğan. His
populist political message of being one of, and representing, the ‘underdogs of
Turkish society’, and his nationalist projection of Turkey as an ‘emerging global
power’ and ‘protector of the powerless and dispossessed’ was particularly appealing
to them. Erdoğan’s election campaign was so much focused on raising nationalist
and Islamic sentiment that the Supreme Elections Council had to ban a political
advertisement of his due to the explicit use of Islamic and Turkish national symbols.
In contrast, Ihsanoğlu appeared too mild, elitist and cosmopolitan for the tastes of
the average MHP voter. As a result, while the AKP was able to increase its vote from
17,802,976 in the March 2014 local elections to 21,000,143 votes in the August
presidential elections, the two major opposition parties failed to mobilize their
voters, despite the highly polarized political environment. While the sum of the
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percentages and votes that the CHP and MHP collected in the March 2014 local
elections amounted to 42.31 per cent and 18,337,381 votes, their common
presidential candidate Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu won only 38.44 per cent, amounting to
15,587,720 votes: that is, approximately 3 million votes less than the combined
result of the two opposition parties in the March 2014 local elections. Instead of
Ihsanoğlu’s penetration of the electoral base of the AKP, there was a net loss of
votes by the two opposition parties, through either abstention or defection. The
turnout of 74.13 per cent – low for Turkish standards – indeed contributed to
the election of prime minister Erdoğan in the first round. Had the CHP and the MHP
appointed their own separate presidential candidates, it appears very likely that
abstention rates among their voters would have been lower, and hence it would not
have been possible for prime minister Erdoğan to declare early victory.
The Electoral Success of HDP
The performance of the third candidate, Selahattin Demirtaş, was one of the surprises
of the presidential election and deserves further elaboration. Demirtaş led an election
campaign which raised many eyebrows. Despite his Kurdish nationalist background,
he abstained from exclusively focusing on the Kurdish issue, as many had suspected
he would do at the beginning of his campaign. Instead, he raised – alongside the
Kurdish question – a set of political issues linked to democratic consolidation, human
rights and the rule of law. By doing this, he aimed to represent the concerns of a wider
electorate than the Kurdish minority, which included leftists, social democrats and
liberals. These used to support the AKP administration when it promoted a bold
economic and political reform programme, but distanced themselves when the AKP
abandoned its reformist and pro-democracy political agenda. This electoral strategy
bore fruit on election day. With 9.76 per cent and 3,958,048 votes, Demirtaş fared
better than most pundits had predicted. He collected votes not only in the Kurdish-
inhabited provinces of eastern and south-eastern Turkey but also in the big cities,
where Turkey’s leftists, social democrats and liberals reside.
Another crucial political message that Demirtaş’ electoral performance delivered
was that the flourishing of the Kurdish political movement does not have to be
pursued through bargaining and de facto collaboration with the AKP. Following the
launch of a ‘Kurdish peace process’ by the Erdoğan administration, Kurdish political
activists in Turkey saw in the person of Erdoğan the leader that could bring about a
historic breakthrough in Turkey’s Kurdish question. This led to improved relations
between the AKP and pro-Kurdish political parties, even though the rule of law and
human rights records of the AKP administration were deteriorating. The 9.76 per
cent that Demirtaş won showed that it is not impossible for new political parties to
get very close to the 10 per cent electoral threshold. The 10 per cent electoral
threshold introduced by the 1982 Constitution has been a big obstacle to the renewal
of the Turkish political party system. Many ambitious attempts to represent
promising social movements failed, as collecting 10 per cent of the vote proved
impossible. Demirtaş’ 9.76 per cent underlined that it would not be unrealistic for a
broad pro-democracy and human rights alliance of Kurdish, social democratic and
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liberal political parties to cross the 10 per cent threshold and win parliamentary
representation.
Constitutional Reform and Controversy Over
the Nature of the Political System
The fulfilment of president Erdoğan’s plans for the introduction of a presidential
system would require an amendment of the Turkish Constitution. In turn, this would
require a two-thirds majority in the 550-seat Turkish Grand National Assembly, in
other words 367 votes. Alternatively a constitutional amendment bill collecting 330
votes, that is three-fifths of the Assembly, could be brought to a popular referendum
and approved if the voters endorse it. While a constitutional amendment appears at
the moment to be a difficult task for the AKP government, what is also possible is a
de facto transfer of executive powers to the president. This would take place through
newly elected president Erdoğan interpreting the constitutional stipulations of his
duties in the widest possible sense. President Erdoğan has already declared his
intention to represent Turkey at key international summits, and to convene and chair
the cabinet. In fact, Erdoğan’s choice of a successor to the offices of prime minister
and party president was heavily influenced by these intentions. The nomination of
Ahmet Davutoğlu as prime minister and president of the AKP showed that personal
loyalty and control over the government and party was the prime criterion for
Erdoğan’s choice. Davutoğlu’s ‘impeccable stance’ during the corruption crisis –
what Erdoğan prefers to call ‘struggle with the “parallel state”’ – was the main
reason for his decision. His choice was also influenced to the evaluation that he
would not pose any obstacle to the de facto introduction of a presidential system.
While it is uncertain that the constitutional amendment desired by Erdoğan will
materialize, it is expected that he will claim a much stronger role than his
predecessors in shaping key policy areas. The Kurdish issue, foreign policy, in
particular Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East, and major construction projects
are all issues that Erdoğan could claim to belong within his own sphere of
competence. The upcoming parliamentary elections, which will take place in June
2015 at the latest, will prove to be a milestone regarding Erdoğan’s ability to
consolidate his hegemonic position in Turkish politics. An even broader
parliamentary majority paving the way to a constitutional amendment according
to his desires would be tantamount to the culmination of the 10 August 2014
electoral victory. As much as it would contradict constitutional stipulations about
the non-partisan and impartial character of the President’s office, a strong personal
involvement of Erdoğan in this parliamentary election campaign in support of prime
minister Davutoğlu and the AKP are highly likely.
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